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Abstract
This paper studies the implications of Black-White diﬀerences in uninsurable
labor market risk for Black-White diﬀerences in the value of human capital. Unin-
surable labor income risk implies that the internal rate of return is an insuﬃcient
statistic for the value of education for risk-averse individuals. A simple asset pricing
approach is applied to labor income streams to estimate the value of human capital
explicitly accounting for the individual’s preferences for risk and uninsurable labor
income risk. It is shown that high school graduation signiﬁcantly reduces the degree
of transitory earnings risk for blacks, but not for whites. A simple calculation shows
that the risk-adjusted rate of return to high school graduation is more one and a
half times the internal rate of return for blacks. Blacks who really dislike risk select
into higher levels of education, showing that the insurance beneﬁt of education for
blacks inﬂuences the behavior of those who value insurance most.
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11 Introduction
This paper applies modern consumption based asset pricing theory to value human capi-
tal in the presence of signiﬁcant labor market risk, and tests for racial diﬀerences in this
value. The theory underlying human capital investment has not kept pace with recent
developments in the value of risky assets1. This seems strange since human capital is one
the most valuable assets that most people ever hold, and it is subject to substantial unin-
surable risk. Human capital theory is based on the comparison of the few period cost of
acquiring human capital to the present discounted value of the resulting increasing stream.
The human capital model which underlies typical Mincerian human capital regressions is
based on a model where individuals only value the gain from education through the eﬀect
of education on permanent income, because all labor income risk is insurable. This paper
will estimate the earnings insurance beneﬁt of education for blacks and whites. It will
also test whether any insurance beneﬁti n ﬂuences education attainment outcomes.
The value of human capital could diﬀer by race due to uninsurable labor market risk.
There are two important sources of black-white diﬀerences in utilization risk. Blacks face
a far higher probability of being incarcerated and blacks are more likely to be unemployed
longer upon displacement than whites. If human capital is not utilized, then the additional
productivity that an individual gains from education has no value. If the utilization of
human capital follows a stochastic process then the value of human capital will depend
on that process. In a world where diﬀerent individuals face diﬀerent stochastic processes
of earnings (as recent work by Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) has found) and labor market
risk is not insurable, the value of human capital is not captured by diﬀerences in mean
earnings (the internal rate of return). The probability of incarceration and the length
of unemployment spell are reduced more for from education for blacks than for whites
(see Lochner and Moretti (2003) and Fairlie and Kletzer (1998)). It is these diﬀerences
in the eﬀect of education on utilization risk (reducing the probability, or length of, of
1There are a number of recent papers that make this point. See Palacios-Huerta (2003) Carneiro,
Hansen, and Heckman (2003), and Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2003) for recent empirical contributions,
and Pries (2001) and Krebs (2003) for recent theoretical contributions.
2non-employment) that make human capital a more valuable asset for blacks than for
whites.
This paper makes both a substantive and methodological contribution to the lit-
erature. On a substantive level, I ﬁnd that high school graduation is a more valuable
asset for blacks than for whites. The source of this diﬀe r e n c ei st h ef a c tt h a th i g hs c h o o l
graduation lowers the transitory standard deviation of the earnings process for blacks
but not for whites. This diﬀerence is shown to imply that risk adjusted rates of return
to high school graduation are over 150 percent larger for blacks than for whites, even if
unadjusted rates of return are the same. A new result is presented that risk preferences
are important determinants of high school graduation. Furthermore, the relationship be-
tween risk and schooling is diﬀerent for blacks and whites, but the relationship between
family background and schooling is not. These results show that educational choice as a
mechanism used by blacks to reduce the risk from transitory earnings shocks. This result
questions the exclusive focus of previous literature on increases in permanent income from
education as a central beneﬁt of increasing educational attainment.
Another new substantive ﬁnding of this paper is that preferences for risk are related
to the estimated transitory volatility of both earnings and wages. This suggests that
individuals are making labor market decisions based on how much they dislike transitory
labor risk. Some jobs may be more or less risky, and individuals are choosing which
income stream to accept based on their preferences for risk. The results for whites in-
dicate that those who dislike risk the least experience the most transitory ﬂuctuations
in earnings. This would not happen in a world where diﬀerences in permanent income
levels are the central determinants of optimal educational attainment choices. Transitory
earnings insurance would have no value in a world the permanent income hypothesis holds
since all transitory ﬂuctuations in labor market income would not result in consumption
ﬂuctuations.
The methodological contribution of this paper is a new method to value human
capital in the presence of heterogeneous labor market risk and preferences for risk. Using
3data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), I apply a parsimonious asset
pricing kernel to estimate the risk-adjusted value of human capital. The method is to
estimate the Sharpe ratio (risk adjusted excess rate of return) to high school graduation
separately by race explicitly accounting for heterogeneous preferences for risk and selection
on unobserved ability. Measures of the risk preferences are used to address the ﬁrst source
of heterogeneity. The second source of heterogeneity is addressed using an instrumental
variables estimator, where the excluded instruments are compulsory schooling laws. No
method has been previously utilized in the literature in a way that accounts for both
sources of heterogeneity.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 will outline previous work, outline
our data and present some new results on the role of preferences for risk in the determi-
nation of educational outcomes. In Section 3, I will present the theory and econometric
implementation of the two strands of the method employed to value human capital. In
Section 4 the results of the analysis will be presented, and Section 5 concludes and presents
an agenda for further research.
2P r e v i o u s L i t e r a t u r e
The current literature on racial diﬀerences in educational attainment (see Neal and John-
son (1996), Cameron and Heckman (2001) and Fryer and Levitt (2003)) emphasizes the
role of long-term factors in determining this gap. It is argued that family background
and income greatly inﬂuence the likelihood of college attendance because students from
disadvantaged backgrounds obtain less human capital early in their academic careers (as
measured by their test scores before they reach college age). This lower level of human
capital then impacts their ability to complete high school and college successfully. How-
ever, this research has not fully explained why this racial diﬀerence in early life human
capital occurs. Another recent contribution (Carneiro, Heckman and Maertov (2003))
has addressed the question of whether blacks look forward and, anticipating labor market
discrimination, optimally choose to invest less in human capital early in their academic
4careers. The majority of the evidence presented does not support this hypothesis.
There are signiﬁcant black-white diﬀerences in the likelihood of being able to fully
employ an individual’s marginal product in the labor market at a given time. Two sources
that are largely responsible for this diﬀerence are black-white diﬀerences in incarceration
rates and in reemployment probabilities conditional on displacement. It has been shown
that increases in educational attainment lower these probabilities more for blacks than
for whites (see Lochner and Moretti (2003) and Fairlie and Kletzer (1998)). Other recent
work by Antcetol and Bedard (2002) has indicated that education reduces time spent non-
employed for blacks more than for whites. This suggests that the standard deviation in
the earnings process due to these exogenous shocks would be reduced more for blacks than
for whites from high school graduation. Recent work by Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) has
shown that there are important unobserved diﬀerences across individuals in the variance
of both the transitory and permanent labor market shocks they experience. Meghir and
Pistaferri do not attempt to assess how time-invariant characteristics of diﬀerent individ-
uals are related to these diﬀerences. Both of these recent strands of work suggest that
blacks and whites may well experience diﬀerent standard deviations in the shock process
of earnings and that the eﬀect of education on this distribution could vary by race.
Could racial diﬀerences in labor market risk oﬀer an explanation for racial diﬀerences
in educational attainment? Recent work has claimed that human capital is a more risky
asset for blacks than whites (see Palacios-Huerta (2003)) and other recent work (Buchin-
sky and Leslie (2001)) has shown that the conditional distribution of rates of return to
education is wider for blacks than for whites (suggesting that education is a more risky
asset for blacks than whites). The research by Palacios-Huerta shows that in terms of the
return per unit risk (or the Sharpe ratio), the value of human capital is greater for whites
than blacks for most levels of education. This suggests that diﬀerences in the riskiness of
education could oﬀer an explanation for the racial diﬀerences in educational attainment
noted by many researchers. Additional risk faced by blacks lowers the risk-adjusted re-
turns to education of blacks relative to whites, even though they face the same unadjusted
mean return. Thus, this additional risk could explain why blacks accumulate less human
5capital than whites.
However, there are three important concerns with Palacios-Huerta’s deﬁnition of
risk and with the representative agent model he uses. Because cross-sectional variance
is used as a measure of risk, it is not clear that this variance reﬂects the uncertainty
that individual’s actually face when they make educational investment decisions. His
estimates of the risk-adjusted rate of return to a year of schooling are based on ordinary
least squares estimates of the internal rate of return and the volatility of that rate of return.
The mean return are likely to be biased upwards due to the omitted variable bias problem
in estimating the mean internal rate of return identiﬁed by many researchers. For the
estimation of risk-adjusted rates of return the volatility of these returns will also be biased
due to omitted variable bias. In this case additional spurious volatility will be generated
by the omitted variable bias. This arises because the omitted variable bias problem will
bias the estimates of the internal rate of return by diﬀerent amounts for diﬀerent samples
and diﬀerent time periods. Palacios-Huerta uses the Current Population Survey, which is
a representative national (on observable dimensions) repeated cross-section sample. So if
individuals with higher or lower internal rates of return to years of schooling are over or
undersampled in diﬀerent years this will generate variation in the internal rate of return
purely from sampling variation. Thus, his estimates of the Sharpe Ratio will be biased
in an unknown because both the numerator and the denominator of this ratio will be
upward biased and we cannot know which term is biased more.
Another salient concern for the estimation of racial diﬀerences in the Sharpe Ratio
arises from the work of Cameron and Heckman (2001). They ﬁnd that dynamics of the
selection bias are diﬀerent for blacks and whites and that accounting for this time-varying
selection process is important in understanding racial diﬀerences in attainment. This
ﬁnding implies that racial diﬀerences in the volatility of internal rates of return estimated
without accounting for the time varying selection process will be biased, and the degree of
bias will vary by race. This is a clear concern in an attempt to estimate racial diﬀerences
in the risk-adjusted rate of return in this fashion. It is also important to note that
the use of only workers employed full-time in the CPS data as in both the analysis in
6Palacios-Huerta and, Buchinsky and Leslie would not capture any racial diﬀerences in
utilization risk due to non-employment. This is likely to be a major concern if diﬀerences
in utilization risk are the principle source of black-white diﬀerences in labor market risk,
as I argue here.
Palacious-Huerta employs a representative agent framework to underlie his esti-
mates. This is a concern in a world where individuals face diﬀerent degrees of risk in the
labor market (as Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) ﬁnd) have diﬀerent preferences for risk,
and there are important frictions in the labor market. It is clear than an individual who
is very risk averse is unlikely to accept a job with a very risky income stream unless he is
compensated for taking on that risk. The individual making choices about which job to
accept and at which wage has far more information available about the riskiness of a job
than is available to the econometrician. For example, an individual when accepting a job
w i l lk n o ww h e t h e rt h ej o bi sp a i do na na n n u a lﬁxed salary basis or solely on commis-
sion. They would have much more information on the probability of displacement than
an econometrician. Thus I expect that (in a world without full compensating diﬀerentials
and incomplete insurance markets) that those who dislike risk a great deal will select
into jobs with steadier incomes streams. This means that observed volatility in income
streams would be correlated with unobserved preferences for risk. So an estimate of the
variance associated a particular labor market choice, in this case education, that does not
take into account the fact that the individuals who select into that labor market choice
have diﬀerent preferences for risk than the average person will be biased.
3 Data Sources and Basic Statistics
This study is conducted using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Numerous
other researchers have used this data set for similar studies of labor market dynamics.
The sample of ﬁfteen years I use contains annual observations on a panel of ﬁve thousand
individuals from 1977 until 1992. A large number of black individuals are in this data
set because it has a poverty oversample (the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO)
7sub-sample). This sub-sample has two thousand observations and a large fraction of
black respondents. A concern here is that using the SEO sub-sample, where many of the
black individuals will come from, will mean that any racial diﬀerences will be confounded
by sampling diﬀerences. I use the PSID sampling weights for all statistics calculated
across individuals to address this issue. All the crucial variables needed for this study are
contained in this data set: race, education, annual labor income, annual social insurance
(unemployment insurance and workers compensation) income, average wage, annual hours
worked, household demographics, industry and sector of employment (in addition to other
variables), as well as some measures of observed labor market shocks, are all included.
In addition, lottery-based measures of risk preferences were surveyed for individuals
in the PSID in 1996. Because of the panel structure of the dataset, I can link these
measures to our sample from earlier years. These types of measures were ﬁrst used
in the Health and Retirement Study and ﬁrst analyzed in Barsky et al. (1997). Similar
measures have been found to be correlated with stock holding (Vissing-Jorgensen (2001)),
wealth accumulation (Charles and Hurst (2003)) and savings (Mazzocco (2003)). These
questions ask respondents about their preferences on ﬁve gambles about lifetime labor
income. These values determine the degree of risk tolerance (which is the inverse of the
degree of relative risk aversion) for that individual. An example of a question asked of a
respondent would be whether or not they would reject a lottery which doubles their job
income with a 50 percent probability or sets that job income to zero with a 50
The sample exclusion rules I impose are the following. I only include household
heads, since many of the variables I require are only measured for these individuals. I
drop female household heads as I do not want to address gender diﬀerences in labor supply
behavior. The reason I only consider two educational categories (high school dropout and
high school graduate or more) is due to the fact that there are very few black college
graduates. I drop those who are not between 22 and 65 years of age in every year of the
sample and drop any observations where the respondent reports they were retired or a
student. For most people leaving the labor force to attend an educational institution or to
retire are not unexpected shocks. Those who change reported race are dropped from the
8sample, since I want to avoid measurement error in terms of racial categories. I also drop
those who are not in the dataset for at least nine consecutive years. Lastly, I drop those
who have annual labor earnings in any year of less than twenty percent of the average
earnings over the sample period. This restriction was imposed by Caroll and Samwick
(1997) (whose methodology I follow) to reduce the confounding eﬀect of measurement
error in earnings in the estimation of the variance of transitory shocks from labor market
earnings data.
I now turn to examine some of the basic statistics and new facts that underlie this
paper. In Table 1 some basic summary statistics are presented from the PSID data esti-
mation sample for the 1977 cross-section. Shown are the means and standard deviations
of the log earnings, log wages and hours. As expected we can see that high school grad-
uates earn more, are paid a higher hourly wage, and work more hours than high school
dropouts. These results are not the focus of this study. The focus of this paper instead
lies in the standard deviations of these variables. We can see in this table that the stan-
dard deviation of both log annual earnings and social insurance income, and log wages are
roughly the same for white high school graduates and high school drop outs. However, this
is not true for black individuals. Black high school graduates have both lower standard
deviations of log annual earnings and social insurance income and log wage than black
high school dropouts. This suggests that black high school graduates face less uncertainty
about their labor market and social insurance income than black high school dropouts,
but the uncertainty about these variables that white individuals face is not related to
their educational attainment. Uncertainty about hours worked falls with education for
both groups, and there does not seem to be any racial diﬀerence here. The goal of this
paper is to more rigorously investigate this relationship, and draw implications about the
value of this uncertainty reduction for the value of human capital.
94 Labor Market Risk and the Value of Human Cap-
ital
The central component of the analysis seeks to adjust internal rates of return to human
capital by the amount of labor market risk faced. I compute Sharpe Ratios for human
capital separately by race in order to analyze the return that a black or white individual
can realize by completing high school per unit of high school dropout risk. This method
improves on previous work by explicitly incorporating heterogeneous preferences for risk
and addresses the confounding eﬀects of selection into education based on unobserved
ability.
The central parameter I seek to estimate in this analysis is the Sharpe Ratio2for
human capital for race j (SRj). The portfolio decision problem the agent faces here is
whether or not to complete high school. The beneﬁt of this investment is that it will
alter the stochastic process of earnings that the individual faces, which will change mean
expected earnings and perhaps the standard deviation of the earnings process. The cost
to the individual is that they could have supplied labor for this time and invested their





The estimation of a Sharpe Ratio (risk-adjusted rate of return) for an asset does
not depend on the absence of liquidity constraints or seperability of utility. It does
impose a signiﬁcant, and potentially restrictive, functional form on the way the individual
values mean returns to human capital, and the volatility of those returns. I assume
throughout this section that the internal rate of return to human capital is equal for
blacks and whites. Earlier estimates in Neal and Johnson (1996) have shown this to
b et h ec a s eo n c ed i ﬀerences in the diﬀerence in skills the blacks and whites bring to
the labor market is taken into account. Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske (1999) ﬁnd that
2The Sharpe Ratio is based on a well posed optimization problem and is not derived here for the sake
of brevity. See Cochrane (2001) for a through treatment of this derivation.
10diﬀerences in marginal products are responsible for wage diﬀerences across diﬀerent races,
again implying that internal rate of return to education should be the same for blacks
and whites.
The task in estimating this parameter then, SRj, is to estimate σ(Rj) for race
j. Individuals of both races face the same risk free rate. The change in the standard
deviation of the earnings process that accompanies the change in educational attainment
is diﬀerent by race, and is what I seek to estimate. Because I am taking other estimates
of the unadjusted excess rate of return, E(Rj) and assuming the risk free rate Rf is
4 percent, the only term in (1) to be estimated is σ(Rj).T h e m e t h o d s e m p l o y e d t o
consistently estimate this parameter are outlined below.
4.1 Estimating The Risk Adjusted Rate of Return to Human
Capital
In this section I describe how I estimate σ(Rj) which is the eﬀect of education on the
volatility of the earnings process for an individual of race j.T od ot h i sIf o l l o wt h em e t h o d
utilized in Carroll and Samwick (1997) to estimate the diﬀerent amount of earnings un-
certainty faced by diﬀerent individuals. Their methodology allows me to decompose the
variance of shocks to log earnings into transitory and permanent components for each
individual in the sample. I construct standard deviations from these variances so that I
am able to map my estimates to the formula in equation (1). I can then examine how
these standard deviations diﬀer by race and educational level. Because these estimates are
the standard deviation of shocks to log income, they are equivalent to shocks to the rate
of return to supplying labor and can be used with unadjusted rates of return to human
capital to derive Sharpe Ratios for high school completion.
I begin by describing the stochastic earnings process. The logarithm of permanent
income for individual i at time t, yP




it = gt + y
P
it−1 + ηit. (2)
11Predictable income growth is denoted by gt, which is income growth related to the lifecycle
and aggregate productivity growth, and ηit is the shock to permanent income in period t.
In the empirical implementation I use age, education, industry, occupation, demographic
characteristics and the interactions of all variables with age, as well as a time trend for
gt. The log of current income yC
it is given by the log of permanent income and an additive





it + εit. (3)
A crucial assumption here is that the errors εit and ηit are uncorrelated with each other
at all leads and lags. This is what allows us to decompose the variance into transitory
and permanent components3. To complete this decomposition I remove the predicted





it−1 + ηit. (4)








it+d + εit+d − y
P
it − εit. (5)
The second equality comes from substituting (3) into the ﬁrst equality. Substituting (4)
into (5) recursively yields,
∆id =[ ηit+1 + ηit+2 + ηit+3 + ... + ηit+d]+εit+d − εit. (6)








εi are the variances of the permanent and transitory shocks to log income
for individual i, respectively.
3This method as it is applied here does not explicitly allow for autocorrelation in the transitory errors
of in current earnings. A number of researchers have found this autocorrelation to follow a second order
moving average process, however Carroll and Samwich show that this method is robust this type of
autocorrelation because year ﬁxed eﬀects are used in the explained component of earnings growth
12Ic a ni d e n t i f yσ2
ηi and σ2
εi in equation (7) for any value of d. For example, if d is
two then the equation (7) is easily solved with an estimate of var(∆di) at hand. I again
follow Carroll and Samwick (1997) in this decomposition. I estimate fourteen var(∆di)’s
for each i (with d t a k i n go nv a l u e s1t o1 4s i n c eIh a v ef o u r t e e nd i ﬀerences) and using
ordinary least squares for each i regress these measures on d and a vector of 14 2’s. The
coeﬃcients on these regressors are the estimates of ˆ σ2
ηi and ˆ σ2
εi respectively. I then have
the permanent and transitory variances in the labor income process for each i.T og e tt h e
standard deviations of the permanent and transitory shocks I take the square root of the
estimated variances.
To compare how observable diﬀerences across individuals aﬀect these standard de-
viations I look at the how the cross-sectional characteristics in 1977 (the ﬁrst year) are
related to these estimates. First I look at the diﬀerences in the means of these estimated
standard deviations by race, education, risk preference, and education within race. Then
I regress the estimated standard deviations on individual characteristics separately by
race, using both ordinary least squares and two stage least squares.
More formally, I estimate the equation
ˆ σi = β1highschoolgraduatei + XiΛ + ui. (8)
for each of the dependent variables ˆ σηi and ˆ σεi and for each race. The estimate of β1 is
the conditional eﬀect of education on the standard deviation of either the transitory or
permanent component of the earnings process. This is the central estimate of interest
needed to form the Sharpe Ratio. The matrix Xi contains the other covariates in the
regression such as age, risk preference, demographic characteristics, occupation, industry
and region, and the matrix Λ contains the estimated coeﬃcients on these covariates. We
estimate this equation by both OLS and TSLS as we are concerned that the omitted
variable (ability) could be correlated with education, and this would bias the all the
estimates in the equation, including the estimate of interest, β1.
The results of the estimation of the coeﬃcients on high school graduation (β1)f o r
the regression of ˆ σηi and ˆ σεi are estimates of the change in the standard deviation that an
13individual of a given race experiences by increasing their education. I can then implement
the Sharpe Ratio formula (1) by using statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on high school
graduation in the following manner. First I standardize the standard deviation of the
shocks to the log of annual income to one for high school dropouts of the same race, so
that the coeﬃcient estimate is a measure of the conditional change in ˆ σηi or ˆ σεi from an
increase in education. I then can express the Sharpe Ratio for high school graduation for









1 is our estimate of the eﬀect of education on the standard deviation of the
shock to annual income for an individual of race j.
A well-known issue in estimating the mean return to education is that of selection
bias. This occurs because those who are of higher ability optimally choose to acquire
more education, so that the internal rate of return estimated in a typical human capital
regression estimated by ordinary least squares is biased upwards (see Heckman, Lalonde,
Smith (1999) and Card (2001)). This is likely to be a concern in the context of the
estimation of the eﬀect of education on earnings volatility also. In the PSID there is
no measure of ability and thus a selection on observables approach is not plausible since
we lack a key observable which determines the selection process. I instead utilize an
instrumental variables two stage least squares procedure to estimate the casual impact of
education on the volatility of the earnings process. The excluded instruments I use are the
same as Lochner and Moretti (2003), the compulsory schooling laws in the state of birth in
place when the individual is age 14. These laws generate plausibly exogenous variation in
educational attainment, and allow me to estimate a local average treatment eﬀect (LATE)
for the eﬀect of high school graduation on the volatility of the earnings process. In general,
the local average treatment eﬀect is not equal to the population average treatment eﬀect.
This would only be true under some strong assumptions on the nature of the selection
and decision process which agents face when making decisions about how much education
14to invest in. The LATE parameter is also a local estimate; only valid in the neighborhood
of the average educational attainment for those who change educational attainment as
a result of the compulsory schooling law changes. See Heckman, Smith, and Clements
(1997) for results that show of the importance of heterogeneous impacts in a well-known
social experiment.
This section has described the methodology used here to estimate the risk adjusted
rate of return (Sharpe Ratio) for high school graduation separately for each race. We ﬁrst
begin by estimating the impact of education on the permanent and transitory standard
deviations of earnings for blacks and whites separately. Next those estimates are used in
the Sharpe Ratio formula as described above to estimate the risk adjusted rate of return
to high school graduation separately for blacks and whites.
5R e s u l t s
This section will discuss the results of the analysis. I discuss the results of estimating the
eﬀect of high school graduation on income uncertainty, how this varies by race, and what
these estimates imply for risk adjusted rates of return to high school completion. I also
attempt to identify the source of the diﬀerence between races in the impact of education
on annual earnings. Finally, I examine how preferences for risk determine educational
attainment choices diﬀerently for whites and blacks.
5.1 Education and Earnings Volatility
This section discusses the results for the impact of high school graduation on the volatility
of the earnings separately for blacks and whites. To begin the empirical implementation I
ﬁrst estimate the standard deviations of the transitory and permanent shocks to earnings
as described above. The method of analysis follows two steps. The ﬁrst step is to take
15out the predictable component of earnings 4and decompose the resulting variance of the
earnings process into the transitory and permanent components. This results in an esti-
mate of the standard deviation of the permanent and transitory components of the shock
process for each individual in the sample. The second step of the analysis examines how
these estimated standard deviations diﬀer by education, race and preferences for risk. I
begin by examining the mean of these standard deviations by racial, education, and risk
preference subgroups. I then estimate cross-sectional regressions for the impact of educa-
tion on these variances, both by Ordinary Least Squares and Instrumental Variables. The
estimates from these regressions provide the crucial estimates to form the Sharpe Ratios
(risk-adjusted rates of return) that lie at the heart of this paper.
In Table 2 the means of the estimated standard deviations of the transitory and
permanent are presented by racial, educational and preference for risk categories. A
number of interesting results emerge from this table. A ﬁrst result to note is that blacks
face less risk from both transitory and permanent shocks to annual earnings. This is
surprising given that previous research has found that blacks are more likely to experience
observed shocks. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the observed shocks examined
in previous work reﬂect only a small fraction of the amount of labor market risk that
individuals face, and unobserved shocks (to the econometrician) may be less frequent or
severe for blacks than whites. The second key result is that black high school graduates
face a signiﬁcantly lower transitory standard deviation of earnings than do black high
school dropouts. The magnitude of this diﬀerence is worth noting; black high school
dropouts face almost twice the risk of transitory ﬂuctuations of earnings than black high
school graduates face. Comparing this to the diﬀerences across education groups for whites
in the transitory standard deviation of earnings we can see that it is somewhat lower for
high school graduates, but not of the magnitude that it is for blacks. The diﬀerences
across education groups within racial groups in the permanent standard deviation of the
4The variables included to take out predictable components of earnings growth are: an age quartic, high
school graduate, black, black*high school graduate, houshold size, marital status dummies, occupational
dummies, industry dummies, year dummies and age age fully intereacted with black, high school graduate,
marital status dummies, occupational dummies and industry dummies
16earnings shows very little diﬀerence. It is interesting to note that education appears to
have little relation to permanent shocks to earnings but is closely related to transitory
shocks to earnings.
One ﬁnal point to take from Table 2 is how the estimated standard deviation of
permanent and transitory earnings are related to preferences for risk. In a world where
full insurance for labor market risk exists, there should be no relationship between pref-
erences for risk and the amount of labor market risk experienced by an individual. In
this world, those who dislike risk more are willing to pay more to purchase insurance or
borrow and lend to smooth consumption (depending on whether the shock is permanent
or transitory). They do not take action to reduce earnings volatility because the volatil-
ity in earnings does not impact the volatility of consumption, which is what individuals
actually care about smoothing. However the results presented in this table contradict
this worldview. Those who dislike risk the least (the individuals with the highest risk tol-
erance) have the largest permanent and transitory standard deviations of earnings. The
results suggest that one way those who dislike risk a great deal insure their consump-
tion is to choose income streams that are less volatile. This could be thought of as a
mechanism to self-insure consumption and suggests there are signiﬁcant credit market
constraints faced by individuals. This result is also interesting given that most of the
macroeconomics literature has focused on wealth holdings as a mechanism to self-insure
and the labor literature has not explored how expected labor market risk inﬂuences labor
market decisions.
The results presented in Table 3 are for selected coeﬃcient estimates from the cross-
sectional regression (8) estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Each column in Table
3 presents the estimates from one regression. Column 1 shows the results for the regression
of the transitory standard deviation of earnings on the selected covariates for the white
sample. The next column shows the results for the same regression speciﬁcation for the
black sample. Columns 3 and 4 are for the same speciﬁcation as columns 1 and 2, but
with the permanent standard deviation as the dependent variable. The other covariates
included in the regression by not entered in the table are indicated in the lower panel and
17are demographic variables such as marital status and the size of the household (described
in more detail in the table notes). The central estimate of interest is the coeﬃcient on
the variable high school graduate, which takes a value of zero if the individual did not
complete high school and one if they did. The interpretation of the coeﬃcient is then
the diﬀerence in the mean of the standard deviation (which ever one is in the regression)
conditional on the other covariates in the speciﬁcation.
The central result to notice in this table is that high school graduation reduces the
standard deviation of earnings for blacks, but not for whites. There is no impact of high
school graduation on the permanent standard deviation of earnings for either blacks or
whites. This result suggests that educational attainment provides an insurance beneﬁt
for blacks in reducing the transitory volatility of the earnings process either by reducing
the probability or the severity of a shock. Another interesting result in Table 3 is that
preferences for risk are signiﬁcant in explaining the transitory standard deviation of the
earnings process for whites but not for blacks. White individuals with high risk tolerance
have larger transitory volatility of the earnings process than those with low risk tolerance.
Again this is consistent with individuals making labor market decisions (such as which
job to accept or which occupation to work in) based on their preferences for risk. Those
who dislike risk the least are the ones who accept the income stream with the most labor
market risk.
One concern with the estimates in Table 3 is that they likely suﬀer from selection
bias. Those who choose to attain higher levels of education are likely to be those of high
ability. Since it is likely that those who are high ability would be less likely to experience
an adverse shock such as job loss, the estimates in Table 3 are biased upwards. I address
this concern using an Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation strategy. The instruments
that I use are compulsory schooling laws in the state that the individual was born in place
when they were 14. These laws generate plausibly exogenous variation in the attainment
levels for diﬀerent individuals depending on when and where they were born. The use of
this IV estimation strategy will allow me to obtain an unbiased Local Average Treatment
Eﬀe c t( L A T E )f o rt h ee ﬀect of high school graduation on the standard deviation of the
18earnings process. This parameter will have a causal interpretation for the subpopulation
that is induced to change educational attainment by a change in the compulsory schooling
law. If the estimate were positive we can say that high school graduate caused the volatility
in earnings to rise.
Turning now to Table 4 we can see that the results are qualitatively the same as
Table 3. The eﬀect of high school on the transitory standard deviation of earnings is
negative for blacks, but not statistically diﬀerent from zero for whites (at the 5 percent
level). This allows to make the statement that high school graduation actually reduces the
transitory volatility for blacks in a casual sense. The fact that this estimate is less than
(and larger in absolute value) than the estimate in Table 3 implies that the individuals
who select into higher education levels do are experiencing less risk. The other coeﬃcient
that is signiﬁcantly diﬀe r e n tf r o mz e r oi nt h i st a b l ei st h a to nt h ei m p a c to fm o d e r a t e
risk tolerance (relative to very low risk tolerance) on the transitory standard deviation
of earning for blacks. This negative estimate result is puzzling. Since that those with
moderate risk tolerance dislike risk less than those with very low risk tolerance we would
expect this coeﬃcient to be positive in an incomplete markets world, or zero in a full-
insurance/permanent income world.
It is important to note one concern in the estimates for whites in Table 4. Instru-
mental Variables estimates are very problematic if the instruments are weak in terms of
changing the endogenous variable (in this case high school graduation). In this case the
ﬁnite sample bias inherent in IV estimation is ampliﬁed a great deal so as to make infer-
ence problematic. One useful statistic to determine if the candidate instruments are of
suﬃcient power is to look at the F-Statistic from the test of if the excluded instruments
are jointly zero in the ﬁrst stage. The ﬁrst stage consists of regressing the endogenous
variable on all of covariates to be used in the second stage as well as the excluded instru-
ments. In this paper this is a regression of the three variables for compulsory schooling
laws, the risk tolerance measures and the other covariates on the high school graduation
variable. If the hypothesis that the three compulsory schooling laws are jointly zero is re-
jected then we can say that the instruments are of suﬃcient strength for the IV estimates
19to be meaningful. In Table 4 we see that the instruments have suﬃcient power for black
individuals, but not for whites. This makes the IV estimates for whites very problematic,
and thus for this group the OLS estimates are preferred even with the likely presence of
selection bias.
The results in Table 3 and 4 both indicate that high school graduation reduces the
transitory volatility of earnings for blacks. However they are only the results from one
speciﬁcation. As sensitivity analysis is it useful to consider a speciﬁcation that includes
more covariates that are likely related to both educational attainment and the volatility of
the earning process. The available variables in the PSID which I add to the speciﬁcation
are occupation, industry and region. The results in Tables 5 and 6 are for this speciﬁcation,
with these additional covariates now included in the same cross-sectional speciﬁcations as
in Tables 3 and 4. The results in Table 5 and 6 essentially conﬁrm the results in Tables 3
and 4. Again, I ﬁnd in both the OLS and IV estimates that high school graduation lowers
the transitory volatility of earnings for blacks. We do not see any relationship between
education and the volatility of the earnings process for whites.
Now the estimates from Tables 3 and 4 can be used to form the Sharpe Ratios for
human capital using the formula above. We can see that both sets of estimates imply that
the Risk-Adjusted Rate of Return to human capital is much larger that the unadjusted
return for Blacks. In fact, the Risk-Adjusted Rate of Return is shown to be between 173
percent and 669 percent larger than the unadjusted rate or return for Blacks. For whites
there is no diﬀerence in the unadjusted and adjusted rate of return since they receive no
insurance beneﬁt to human capital accumulation. These estimates suggest that the value
of this earnings insurance is very signiﬁcant for the value of high school graduation for
blacks.
In sum, I have shown that blacks receive an insurance beneﬁtf r o mh i g hs c h o o l
graduation whereas whites do not. This result is not driven other observed covariates
that are likely related to both educational attainment and the volatility of the earning
process. Concerns about selection bias in the estimates are addressed through the use of
20instrumental variables estimation with a plausibly exogenous determinant of high school
graduation, and do not explain the central result. The key results that earnings volatility
is reduced for blacks and that preferences for risk are related to earnings volatility are
shown to be robust to these concerns. It is shown that estimates imply that the risk-
adjusted rate of return to high school graduate is far larger than the unadjusted rate of
return for blacks but not for whites.
5.2 Sources of Earnings Volatility
This section examines the sources of this racial diﬀerence in the insurance beneﬁto f
education. First I examine whether this result is coming from wage risk. Then I look at
diﬀerences in the probability of occurrence of observed shocks by race and educational
group.
The results for the impact of education on wage volatility are reported in Tables 7
and 8. The methodology to estimate the transitory and permanent standard deviation
of the wage is identical to that used above. The speciﬁcation to estimate the impact
education on these standard deviations for the 1977 cross-section is identical to that used
above. In the OLS estimates in Table 7 we see again that high school graduation reduces
the transitory standard deviation of wages for blacks but not for whites. I also ﬁnd that
risk tolerance is signiﬁcant in explaining transitory wage volatility for whites. In Table
8 when I estimate this same speciﬁcation by IV we ﬁnd that the signiﬁcant relationship
between high school graduation and transitory wage volatility disappears. It seems that
racial diﬀerences in the response of wage risk to education are not the source of the results
in previous tables.
In Table 10 I look at the how three observed labor market shocks diﬀer by race
and educational group. This table displays the mean of three shocks variables. The
displaced variable is an indicator of whether the individual was exogenously displaced
in the previous year. The health signiﬁcantly limits the ability to work variable is an
indicator that takes a value of one if the individual responds that they have a health
21condition that limits their ability to work signiﬁcantly, and is zero otherwise. The job
search duration variable measures in days the length of the last job search spell for those
who are currently employed (since they have complete spells). The results of this table
show that high school graduation is associated with a small increase in the probability of
displacement, and a signiﬁcant drop in the probability of having a work limiting health
condition for individuals of both races. These changes in the probability of having one
of these observed shocks do not seem to be related to education diﬀe r e n t l yb yr a c e .J o b
search duration does seem to be lowered more from high school graduation more for blacks
than whites. However, this diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant.
5.3 Preferences for Risk and Educational Attainment
Figures 1 and 2 show the new facts at the heart of this paper. The distributions of risk
preferences are plotted by race and education. The interesting result in these ﬁgures
is the diﬀerence in how individuals select into high school education in terms of risk
preferences by race. For blacks (see Figure 1) we see that those with very low levels of
risk tolerance (very risk averse) are more likely to be high school graduates. In contrast,
we see the opposite relationship for whites in Figure 2, where those with very low tolerance
for risk are less likely to be high school graduates. None of the diﬀerences in other risk
t o l e r a n c ec a t e g o r i e si ss i g n i ﬁcant. This diﬀering relationship between preferences for risk
and educational attainment is suggestive. The revealed preferences indicate that for
blacks high school graduation reduces labor risk, but for whites this risk is increased.
When taken together with the results that high school graduation reduces the transitory
earnings volatility of earnings for blacks, and that more risk averse blacks select into high
school graduation is questions the focus of the human capital literature on permanent
income considerations as the only determinant of educational outcomes.
Of course it could certainly be true that family background diﬀerences are far more
important determinants of education choices than preferences for risk. Table 11 reports
a probit model designed to investigate this by examining the relationship between educa-
22tional attainment, risk preferences, parents’ educational attainment, and state of birth.
In column one I ﬁnd that after controlling for parents’ education and state of birth, risk
preferences are a signiﬁcant determinant of educational attainment. In column two we
see a very interesting pattern in the relationship between risk preferences and attainment;
it diﬀers by race, but the relationship between attainment and parents’ background does
not! This new ﬁnding again suggests that the role of education in eﬀecting labor market
risk is diﬀerent by race. The marginal eﬀect estimates in Table 11 for the racial interac-
tions show that blacks with higher levels of risk tolerance are less likely to graduate high
school than blacks with lower levels of risk tolerance. So those who would most value the
insurance beneﬁt of education that blacks receive are the ones who are more likely to have
a higher level of educational attainment. However, this result does not hold for whites,
where we ﬁnd that those with a high tolerance for risk are more likely to complete high
school.
Previously work by Chen (2003) has found that preferences for risk do not have a
diﬀerent impact on the probability of college attendance by race, so the results here are
diﬀerent from prior work. This is could be due to the fact that Chen has access to a more
crude measure of preferences for risk in the NLSY, which is a binary indicator variable
for highly risk averse or not. It could also be true that there is not much diﬀerence in
the shock process for earnings between high school graduates and college graduates for
blacks.
T h e s er e s u l t ss h o wt h a tb l a c k sw h oa r em o r er i s ka v e r s ea r em o r el i k e l yt oc o m p l e t e
high school than blacks who are less risk averse. The opposite result holds for whites where
those who are less risk averse are more likely to complete high school. These results are
consistent with the insurance beneﬁt that blacks receive from high school graduation
having signiﬁcant value and inﬂuencing the behavior of those who value this insurance
beneﬁt the most.
236 Conclusions
The central contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that high school graduation is a
more valuable asset for blacks than for whites. The estimates of this paper indicate the
result is due to the fact that high school graduation reduces the amount of labor market
risk faced by blacks, but has no impact on labor market risk for whites. The implications
for the risk adjusted return to education for blacks are shown to be very large. Further-
more, the source of this diﬀerence in labor market risk, transitory earnings ﬂuctuations, is
identiﬁed. The ﬁnding that not only do preferences for risk matter for educational choice,
but also the eﬀect of risk preferences on educational choice is diﬀe r e n tb yr a c e-a n dt h a t
the eﬀect of family background is not - suggests an important role for labor market risk
in explaining racial diﬀerences in educational attainment. The other central contribution
of this paper is to demonstrate that preferences for risk are related to transitory earnings
(and wage) volatility. Neither of these ﬁndings can be explained by a model of optimal
educational attainment set in a world where the permanent income hypothesis holds. It
seems than that it would be proﬁtable for researchers in labor economics to consider re-
laxing the strong assumptions of the permanent income hypothesis in other contexts, and
consider whether other observed labor market behavior is related to the desire to insure
labor market risk.
This research leaves open the question of what the precise mechanisms behind this
result are. Are these diﬀerences in the volatility of the earnings process for resulting from
education for blacks driven risky job assignments diﬀering by race and education level for
example? It would be proﬁtable to examine data on how ﬁrms actually employ workers
of diﬀerent races and education levels in diﬀerent tasks. It would also be interesting to
examine whether there is a diﬀerence in compensation methods between blacks and whites
of diﬀerence skills. Perhaps black high school dropouts are often employed in ﬁrms where
they are paid by piece-rate or sales commissions, which may well be more volatile than
an annual salary.
The methods employed here could also be employed to examine if there are insur-
24ance beneﬁts to tenure, and who might receive them. This would add signiﬁcant value
to the tenure for an individual, which is not captured in previous estimates and might
potentially explain why diﬀerent individuals have diﬀerence tenures. This would be an-
other opportunity to examine whether relaxing some of the assumptions underlying the
permanent income hypothesis would help us to better understand the determinants of
labor market outcomes.
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Table 1: Earnings, Wages and Hours by Race and Education 
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Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data.  The sample contains 790 white high school 
graduate observations, 164 white high school dropout observations, 132 black high school graduate 
observation, and 135 black high school dropout observations, and is the 1977 cross-section.  All estimates 
weight observations by probability of sampling weights.  Dependent variables are measured in 1992 
Dollars using the GDP consumption deflator.   30
 Table 2: Means of Transitory and Permanent Standard Deviation of Log Annual Labor 








































































Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data.   All estimates weight observations by 
probability of sampling weights.  The sample contains 1280 observations.  Log annual labor and social 
insurance income is measured in 1992 Dollars using the GDP consumption deflator. 
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Table 3: OLS Estimates for Transitory and Permanent Standard Deviations of  
Log Annual Labor and Social Insurance Income By Race 
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Demographics  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry    No No No No 
Occupation  No No No No 
Region No 
 
No No No 
Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data.  Estimates and standards errors (in parentheses) 
presented are the multiplied by 100.  All regressions include a constant , an age quartic, and a missing risk 
tolerance measure dummy.  Demographic measures included are dummies for the marital status and, a 
variable for the number of members in the household.  Occupation and Industry controls are eight industry 
and eight occupation dummies as well as missing indicators for each of industry and occupation.  Region 
controls contain six dummy variables for the census regions.  All estimates weight observations by 
probability of sampling weights.  The sample contains 984 white and 276 black observations for the 1977 
cross-section.  Log annual labor and social insurance income is measured in 1992 Dollars using the GDP 
consumption deflator.   32
Table 4: TSLS Estimates for Transitory and Permanent Standard Deviations of 
Log of Annual Labor and Social Insurance Income By Race 
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Demographics  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry    No No No No 
Occupation  No No No No 
Region No 
 
No No No 
 




















Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data.  Estimates and standards errors (in parentheses) 
presented are the multiplied by 100.  The excluded instruments are three dummy variables for compulsory 
schooling laws in the individuals’ state of birth in the year they were age 14.  All regressions include a 
constant, an age quartic, and a missing risk tolerance measure dummy.  Demographic measures included 
are dummies for the marital status and, a variable for the number of members in the household.  Occupation 
and Industry controls are eight industry and eight occupation dummies as well as missing indicators for 
each of industry and occupation.  Region controls contain six dummy variables for the census regions.  All 
estimates weight observations by probability of sampling weights.  The sample contains 960 white and 271 
black observations for the 1977 cross-section.  Log annual labor and social insurance income is measured 
in 1992 Dollars using the GDP consumption deflator. 
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Table 5: OLS Estimates for Transitory and Permanent Standard Deviations of  
Log Annual Labor and Social Insurance Income By Race 
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Demographics  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data.  Estimates and standards errors (in parentheses) 
presented are the multiplied by 100.  All regressions include a constant, an age quartic,  and a missing risk 
tolerance measure dummy.  Demographic measures included are dummies for the marital status and, a 
variable for the number of members in the household.  Occupation and Industry controls are eight industry 
and eight occupation dummies as well as missing indicators for each of industry and occupation.  Region 
controls contain six dummy variables for the census regions.  All estimates weight observations by 
probability of sampling weights.  The sample contains 984 white and 276 black observations for the 1977 
cross-section.  Log annual labor and social insurance income is measured in 1992 Dollars using the GDP 
consumption deflator.   34
Table 6: TSLS Estimates for Transitory and Permanent Standard Deviations of 
Log of Annual Labor and Social Insurance Income By Race 
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Demographics  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 




















Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data.  Estimates and standards errors (in parentheses) 
presented are the multiplied by 100.  The excluded instruments are three dummy variables for compulsory 
schooling laws in the individuals’ state of birth in the year they were age 14.  All regressions include a 
constant, an age quartic,  and a missing risk tolerance measure dummy.  Demographic measures included 
are dummies for the marital status and, a variable for the number of members in the household.  Occupation 
and Industry controls are eight industry and eight occupation dummies as well as missing indicators for 
each of industry and occupation.  Region controls contain six dummy variables for the census regions.  All 
estimates weight observations by probability of sampling weights.  The sample contains 960 white and 271 
black observations for the 1977 cross-section.  Log annual labor and social insurance income is measured 
in 1992 Dollars using the GDP consumption deflator. 
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Table 7: OLS Estimates for Transitory and Permanent Standard Deviations of  
Log Wage By Race 
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Demographics  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data.  Estimates and standards errors (in parentheses) 
presented are the multiplied by 100.  All regressions include a constant, an age quartic,  and a missing risk 
tolerance measure dummy.  Demographic measures included are dummies for the marital status and, a 
variable for the number of members in the household.  Occupation and Industry controls are eight industry 
and eight occupation dummies as well as missing indicators for each of industry and occupation.  Region 
controls contain six dummy variables for the census regions.  All estimates weight observations by 
probability of sampling weights.  The sample contains 984 white and 276 black observations for the 1977 
cross-section.  Log wage is measured in 1992 Dollars using the GDP consumption deflator.   36
Table 8: TSLS Estimates for Transitory and Permanent Deviations of 
Log Wage By Race 
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Demographics  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 




















Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data.  Estimates and standards errors (in parentheses) 
presented are the multiplied by 100.  The excluded instruments are three dummy variables for compulsory 
schooling laws in the individuals’ state of birth in the year they were age 14.  All regressions include a 
constant, an age quartic,  and a missing risk tolerance measure dummy.  Demographic measures included 
are dummies for the marital status and, a variable for the number of members in the household.  Occupation 
and Industry controls are eight industry and eight occupation dummies as well as missing indicators for 
each of industry and occupation.  Region controls contain six dummy variables for the census regions.  All 
estimates weight observations by probability of sampling weights.  The sample contains 960 white and 271 
black observations for the 1977 cross-section.  Log wage is measured in 1992 Dollars using the GDP 
consumption deflator.   37
Table 9: Black-White Risk Adjusted Rates of Return to High School Graduation 
 
 Internal  Rate 
of Return 

















































































Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data.  The values in the first column are two assumed 
candidate mean internal rates of return to high school graduation without any adjustment for risk.  The 
values in the second column are the based on the estimates of the effect of high school graduation on the 
transitory variance of log labor and social insurance income from Tables 4 and 6.  If the coefficient in these 
tables is insignificantly different from zero, then zero is used.  The values in the third column are computed 
by taking the values in column 1 and dividing them by the percent of the base value (high school drop out 
for the relevant race from column 2 in Table 2) that the value in column 2 represents.  
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Table 10: Labor Market Shocks by Race and Education 
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Health Significantly Limits 






























Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data.  The sample contains 12021 observations from 
the 1983-1992 panel.  All estimates weight observations by probability of sampling weights.  The values in 
parentheses’ are standard errors.   39










































Black * Father Some High School  -  -0.0892 
(0.1546) 
Black * Father High School Graduate  -  0.0555 
(0.0472) 
Black * Mother Some High School  -  0.0305 
(0.0514) 
Black * Mother High School Graduate  -  0.0791 
(0.0252) 
Black * Low Risk Tolerance  -  0.0814 
(0.0297) 
Black * Moderate Risk Tolerance  -  -0.1671 
(0.2093) 






















Black * Risk Tolerance 
- 19.32 
(0.0002) 
Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data.  Estimates presented are marginal effects, and 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.  All regressions include a constant, state of 
birth dummies, dummies for missing values in fathers and mothers’ education, missing risk tolerance   40
measures, and an age quartic.  The interaction specifications also include a black dummy variable.  The 
omitted category for fathers and mothers education is no high school.  The omitted category for risk 
tolerance is very low risk tolerance.  All estimates weight observations by probability of sampling weights.  
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